





A NEW APPROACH TO INSANITY ACQUITTEE RECIDIVISM:  
REDEFINING THE CLASS OF TRULY RESPONSIBLE RECIDIVISTS 
MAURA CAFFREY†
INTRODUCTION 
After receiving verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity, John 
McGee and Ronald Manlen were committed to Michigan mental hos-
pitals.1  The center for forensic psychiatry later determined that 
McGee and Manlen were “no longer mentally ill and dangerous” and 
released them.2  Shortly after being released, McGee kicked his wife to 
death3 and Manlen raped two women.4
The public outcry that followed these tragic events prompted the 
Michigan legislature to statutorily authorize the “guilty but mentally 
ill” (GBMI) verdict in cases where a defendant raises the insanity de-
fense.5  The verdict permits the jury to find that although the defen-
dant is mentally ill, she is not legally insane, and she may be given a 
full criminal sentence.  A defendant who receives a GBMI verdict must 
receive appropriate psychiatric treatment while imprisoned.6
Several other states, faced with similar high-profile crimes com-
mitted by released insanity acquittees, also adopted the GBMI ver-
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1 Sharon Morey Brown & Nicholas J. Wittner, Criminal Law, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 335, 
356-57 (1979). 
2 Id. at 357. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. (citing George D. Mesritz, Comment, Guilty but Mentally Ill:  An Historical and 
Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URB. L. 471, 483 (1976)). 
5 Id. (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West Supp. 1978)). 
6 Id. 
  
400 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 399 
 
dict.7  Some state legislatures considered the complete abolition of 
the insanity defense,8 while others heightened the requirements for 
release from post-insanity acquittal commitment (PIAC)9 or imple-
mented conditional release programs.10
This Comment evaluates the current methods employed by states 
to cope with insanity acquittee recidivists and proposes a new solution 
that strikes a balance between rehabilitating insane offenders and pro-
tecting the public from dangerous acquittees.  Part I evaluates the ba-
sic problem of insanity acquittee recidivism and explores the roles 
played by inaccurate release decisions and post-release medication 
noncompliance in exacerbating the problem.  Part II addresses vari-
ous approaches adopted by state legislatures and courts to deal with 
insanity acquittee recidivism.  This Comment will argue that these ap-
proaches are impractical, inequitable, or unconstitutional.  Finally, in 
Part III, this Comment proposes a new method of minimizing insanity 
acquittee recidivism:  abolishing the insanity defense for acquittee re-
cidivists who are deemed sane upon release and who subsequently fail 
to abide by their post-release treatment regimen. 
7 See, e.g., Vicki L. Plaut, Punishment Versus Treatment of the Guilty but Mentally Ill, 74 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 428, 435 (1983) (“[P]ublic outrage over post-release crimi-
nal behavior by two insanity acquittees spurred the creation of Illinois’ guilty but men-
tally ill alternative.”); Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict:  An Idea 
Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 498 n.18 (1985) (“[A] 
precipitating factor behind Georgia’s guilty but mentally ill legislation was a multiple 
murder commited [sic] by an insanity acquittee shortly after his release.” (citing NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE “GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL” PLEA AND VERDICT:  AN EM-
PIRICAL STUDY:  FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2-3 (working draft Nov. 15, 1984) (on file with the George Wash-
ington Law Review))). 
8 See, e.g., Lisa Callahan, Connie Mayer & Henry J. Steadman, Insanity Defense Re-
form in the United States—Post-Hinckley, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 54, 54-
59 (1987) (discussing insanity defense reforms considered by legislatures after John 
Hinckley was acquitted by reason of insanity for the attempted assassination of Presi-
dent Reagan); Cynthia A. Hagan, Commentary, The Insanity Defense:  A Review of Recent 
Statutory Changes, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 618 (1982) (explaining that the Idaho legisla-
ture abolished the insanity defense because of the public outrage over an attempted 
murder committed by an insanity acquittee); Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise:  The 
Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded in Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved 
the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 972 (1987) (“Within 
two weeks of . . . shootings [by an insanity acquittee], proposals were introduced in the 
[Alaska] state legislature to abolish or restrict the use of the insanity defense . . . .”). 
9 See infra Part II.A.1 (detailing two approaches adopted by states:  evaluating an 
acquittee for release in an unmedicated state, and taking the likelihood of medication 
compliance into account in making release decisions). 
10 See infra Part II.A.2. 
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I.  THE PROBLEM OF INSANITY ACQUITTEE RECIDIVISM 
Insanity acquittee recidivism is a problem of grave concern for 
both the criminal justice system and the mental health profession.  Al-
though “[i]nsanity acquittees have been the focus of intense study” 
since the mid-1970s,11 researchers have found it difficult to determine 
precise meta-analysis recidivism rates.12  One source of difficulty is that 
the actual definition of recidivism varies significantly from study to 
study:  some researchers define recidivism broadly, including any in-
cidents of rehospitalization based on acts for which the acquittee 
could have been rearrested;13 others define it more narrowly, only in-
cluding rearrests.14  Furthermore, “[l]ocal and jurisdictional nuances 
[may] have a dramatic effect on the rate[s] of rearrest,”15 thereby 
making it more difficult for researchers to deduce statistical trends 
from the recidivism data available. 
Despite the methodological inconsistencies among the studies, 
one general conclusion may be drawn.  The recidivism rate of insanity 
acquittees roughly corresponds to the recidivism rate of the general 
prison population.16  Thus, many of the standard risk factors com-
monly employed to predict criminal recidivism are equally applicable 
11 Victoria L. Harris, Insanity Acquittees and Rearrest:  The Past 24 Years, 28 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 225, 225 (2000). 
12 See id. at 229-30 (“Numerous articles have commented on the difficulty of com-
paring the rearrest rates of insanity acquittees.”). 
13 See, e.g., Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, A Comparison of Criminal Recidivism 
Among Schizophrenic and Nonschizophrenic Offenders, 15 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 397, 404 
(1992) (defining recidivism as including “any acts which brought the offender back to 
[the] hospital, but for which the offender could have been criminally charged”). 
14 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 11, at 230 (noting that rehospitalizing (rather than 
rearresting) an offender poses problems for recidivism analysis). 
15 Id. 
16 See In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 480 (N.Y. 1995) (“[The] recidivism rate [of 
insanity acquittees is] equal to that of prison populations.” (quoting Warren J. Ingber, 
Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class:  The Commitment and Release of Persons Acquitted of Vio-
lent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 296 (1982))); Harris, supra note 
11, at 230 (“In studies spanning decades, the rearrest rates of released insanity acquit-
tees are as high as those persons released from jail and prison.”); Mark L. Pantle et al., 
Comparing Institutionalization Periods and Subsequent Arrests of Insanity Acquittees and Con-
victed Felons, 8 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 305, 313 (1980) (finding a twenty-four percent recidi-
vism rate for insanity acquittees and a twenty-seven percent recidivism rate for con-
victed felons over a six-year period).  But see Mary Robinson, The Insanity Defense:  Does It 
Serve Justice?  Does It Protect the Public?, 71 ILL. B.J. 306, 309 (1983) (describing the 
statements of Dr. Jay LeBow, a panelist at an Illinois Bar Association forum on the in-
sanity defense, who asserted that the recidivism rate of insanity acquittees is substan-
tially lower than the recidivism rate of convicted defendants).
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to insanity acquittees.17  Past criminal violence is of particular salience 
as “the clinical consensus is that a history of violent behavior in an in-
dividual is the single best predictor of future violence.”18
This suggests that an insanity acquittee’s history of prior vio-
lence—and not her mental illness per se—will increase the likelihood 
that she will act violently in the future.  If, as many researchers assert, 
insanity acquittees as a class are no more violent than convicted de-
fendants,19 then the similarity between the recidivism rates makes 
sense:  “the number and nature of prior violent acts,” and not one’s 
diagnosis, is the most accurate predictor of future violence.20  How-
ever, several important factors distinguish imprisonment from PIAC 
and make the insanity acquittee recidivism rate more troubling. 
First, state legislatures have adopted various statutes to deal with 
the problem of convicted recidivists.21  By 1992, the federal system and 
all fifty states had enacted some form of sentence-enhancing recidi-
vism statute.22  Although the effectiveness of such laws is hotly de-
bated,23 the fact remains that institutional mechanisms are in place to 
deal with repeat convicted offenders.  Under a “three strikes law,” for 
example, a third-time convicted felon generally will be subjected to a 
substantially longer term of imprisonment.24
 
17 See Harris, supra note 11, at 226 (“[R]earrest among insanity acquittees [is] 
likely to be influenced by factors that influence repetitive criminal behavior . . . . Past 
criminal behavior, age, and gender have consistently been shown to be highly influen-
tial factors in the determination of future criminal behavior.”). 
18 Ingber, supra note 16, at 295. 
19 See Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 439, 448 (1974) (noting “the lack of a clear-cut association between mental ill-
ness . . . and dangerous behavior”); Slobogin, supra note 7, at 504 (“[T]here is only a 
very weak correlation between severe mental illness and violent behavior . . . .”). 
20 Slobogin, supra note 7, at 504.  But see Ingber, supra note 16, at 297 (“[V]iolent 
insanity acquittees comprise a particularly dangerous class of individuals.”). 
21 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1 (West 2005) (providing that certain third-
time offenders will be sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 1998) (providing sentence enhancement for “per-
sistent felony offender[s]”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714 (West Supp. 2005) (pro-
viding for minimum ten-year sentences for violent recidivists). 
22 See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1992) (“[Sentence-enhancing recidivism] 
laws currently are in effect in all 50 states and several have been enacted by the Federal 
Government, as well.” (citations omitted)).
23 See, e.g., Daniel Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws:  A Reconsideration, 21 BUFF. L. 
REV. 99, 105 (1971) (arguing that recidivism statutes fail both to deter repeat offenders 
and to protect the public adequately). 
24 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(b) (West 1999); Ewing v. California, 538 
U.S. 11, 20, 30-32 (2003) (upholding the defendant’s sentence of twenty-five years to 
life for stealing three golf clubs under California’s three strikes law); State v. Oliver, 
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In contrast, there is no similar guarantee of incapacitation in the 
context of insanity acquittee recidivists.  Most likely, a reoffending ac-
quittee will be reinstitutionalized.  Unlike the statutorily imposed sen-
tence enhancement that a convicted recidivist will receive, however, 
the length of an acquittee’s confinement is far less definite.25  Perhaps 
a court will consider an acquittee’s past recidivism when it eventually 
decides whether or not to release her.  However, recidivism will be 
only one factor among many that the court will take into account in 
assessing the current dangerousness of an acquittee and her suitability 
for release.26
Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, consideration of re-
cidivism in a release decision may raise constitutional issues that will 
prevent the continued confinement of an insanity acquittee who still 
poses a danger to society.  In Foucha v. Louisiana, the United States 
Supreme Court held that under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, a state may not continue to hold an insanity ac-
quittee who is still considered dangerous but is no longer mentally 
ill.27  The Court reiterated the rule it set forth in Jones v. United States 
that  a “‘committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recov-
ered his sanity or is no longer dangerous,’ i.e., [that] the acquittee 
may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no 
longer.”28  Thus, if a judge were to prolong an insanity acquittee’s con-
finement solely because the acquittee was a known recidivist, such ac-
tion would violate Foucha if the acquittee were no longer considered 
mentally ill.29  Therefore, although recidivism will generally guarantee 
 
745 A.2d 1165, 1167-68 (N.J. 2000) (affirming a third-time offender’s sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole after he was convicted of first degree robbery and aggra-
vated assault under New Jersey’s three strikes law). 
25 Because an insanity acquittee may only be committed so long as she is both men-
tally ill and dangerous, Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983), the length of 
an acquittee’s confinement is unpredictable:  she may be committed for only a few 
weeks or perhaps indefinitely.  See, e.g., People v. Pastewski, 647 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ill. 
1995) (allowing an acquittee’s past recidivism to enhance his maximum commitment 
period, but noting that the acquittee “may be released anytime he regains his sanity”). 
26 See, e.g., In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 481 (N.Y. 1995) (listing a “history of 
prior relapses into violent behavior” as one type of evidence to be considered in deter-
mining if an acquittee currently poses a danger to herself or others). 
27 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 362). 
28 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 368). 
29 See, e.g., In re Gafford, 903 P.2d 61, 65 (Idaho 1995) (holding that a state statute 
permitting acquittees to be confined on the basis of dangerousness alone violated 
Foucha).  But see State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 94, 106-07 (Wis. 1995) (interpreting 
Foucha to permit the continued confinement of an insanity acquittee based on danger-
ousness alone, as long as the commitment is limited to the maximum term the acquit-
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a longer sentence for a convicted offender, the role recidivism will 
play in determining the length of an acquittee’s confinement is less 
definitive. 
A second factor that distinguishes insanity acquittee recidivism 
from convicted offender recidivism—and makes the similarity in re-
cidivism rates more troubling—is that PIAC focuses on treating the 
problems of acquittees, whereas ordinary imprisonment does not spe-
cifically seek to rehabilitate prisoners.30  In Jones, Justice Powell ob-
served that PIAC is intended to “treat the individual’s mental illness 
and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.”31  
Thus, one would hope that when the acquittee is eventually released 
from confinement (i.e., she is no longer considered both mentally ill 
and dangerous), many of the problems that resulted in commitment 
would be resolved, or at the very least, substantially improved.32  The 
rehabilitation efforts of the PIAC system should, in theory, improve 
the irrational thought process that led the acquittee to commit crimi-
nal acts that resulted in her initial commitment.  The same hope can-
not be fostered with regard to the prison system, which values retribu-
tion and incapacitation over the rehabilitation of inmates.33  American 
prisons “rehabilitate[] no one.”34  Rather, “[m]ost criminal offenders 
who change for the better do so in spite of prison not because of it.”35
If PIAC treats the acquittee’s underlying problems and imprison-
ment merely punishes and confines convicts, what accounts for the 
 
tee would have received if convicted and the commitment statute is reasonably related 
to the purpose for which the acquittee is committed). 
30 See Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines:  Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 952 (1995) (“[I]n light of cur-
rent knowledge . . . imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correc-
tion and rehabilitation. . . . [A]lmost everyone involved in the criminal justice system 
now doubts that rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting . . . . [N]o 
one can really detect whether or when a prisoner is rehabilitated.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (footnotes omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38, 76 (1983))). 
31 Jones, 463 U.S. at 368. 
32 See Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger:  An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 113, 128 n.44 (1996) (noting that in cases of extreme mental illness, medica-
tion can reduce the risk of further violence by “ameliorating the crazy thinking”). 
33 See, e.g., Richard Lowell Nygaard, Crime, Pain, and Punishment:  A Skeptic’s View, 
102 DICK. L. REV. 355, 363 (1998) (“The ugly truth is that we punish because it makes 
us feel good to get even.”); Debra Todd, Sentencing of Adult Offenders in Cases Involving 
Sexual Abuse of Children:  Too Little, Too Late?  A View from the Pennsylvania Bench, 109 
PENN ST. L. REV. 487, 518 (2004) (citing the argument that “America has never truly 
been committed to [the] rehabilitation” of criminals). 
34 Nygaard, supra note 33, at 362. 
35 Id. at 362-63. 
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similar rates of post-release recidivism among the two groups of of-
fenders?  The premature release of insanity acquittees and post-
release medication noncompliance are two possible explanations.  
A.  Inaccurate, Premature Release Decisions 
An acquittee must be released from PIAC when she is adjudged 
no longer to be both mentally ill and dangerous.36  Expert testimony 
regarding the acquittee’s current mental health and future danger-
ousness will often be decisive in the release decision.37  However, the 
ability of experts to predict accurately the mental stability and safety of 
an acquittee upon release from the hospital is questionable.  Studies 
on expert risk assessment suggest different rates of accuracy,38 the 
most favorable study reporting that expert predictions are correct just 
over fifty percent of the time.39  Thus, approximately half of all insan-
ity acquittees will either be prematurely released or unnecessarily con-
fined. 
Although the development of more advanced actuarial risk as-
sessment tools may improve the accuracy of experts’ predictions,40 in-
herent limitations remain that will inevitably produce some inaccurate 
decisions.  No expert can account for every future precipitating factor 
that may cause an insanity acquittee to decompensate and act danger-
ously.  The mind is exceedingly complex, and psychological diseases 
are not amenable to precise scientific explanation.  Thus, even the 
most experienced expert, utilizing the most advanced tools, will find it 
 
36 Jones, 463 U.S. at 368. 
37 Many state statutes require that mental health professionals evaluate the acquit-
tee and report their findings to the court before a release decision is made.  See, e.g., 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 704–414 (Supp. 2004) (requiring that three experts examine the 
defendant prior to conditional release); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 (McKinney 
Supp. 2004) (mandating submission of a psychiatrist’s report before a defendant can 
be released). 
38 See, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47 
(1981) (“[P]sychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of 
three predictions of violent behavior . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Joseph T. McCann, 
Risk Assessment and the Prediction of Violent Behavior, FED. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 18, 18 (stat-
ing that predictions of mental health professionals are “better than chance”). 
39 See Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 1007, 1009 (1993) (“[C]linicians were above chance in their predictions of 
violence (equivalently, we can reject the null hypothesis that sensitivity and specificity 
equaled 50%).”).
40 Id. at 1010-11. 
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difficult to assess the future behavior of many acquittees.41  This is par-
ticularly true when the only context in which the acquittee has been 
observed is the safe, controlled environment of the hospital. 
Although inaccurate release decisions certainly affect the rate of 
insanity acquittee recidivism, solutions to this problem are beyond the 
scope of this Comment,42 which focuses on post-release means of reduc-
ing recidivism. 
B.  Post-Release Medication Noncompliance 
Professor Stephen Morse has opined that “[i]n the case of seri-
ously crazy people, whose irrational practical reasoning leads to the 
intent to do harm, ameliorating the crazy thinking through proper 
medication should in fact reduce the risk of harmdoing.”43  If Morse’s 
postulation is accurate, then what accounts for the recidivism of insan-
ity acquittees after they have been released from the hospital and their 
sanity presumably has been restored? 
The most sensible explanation is that many insanity acquittees fail 
to abide by the treatment regimen developed for them while they 
were hospitalized.  For a mentally ill individual, medication compli-
 
41 See Diamond, supra note 19, at 452 (“Neither psychiatrists nor other behavioral 
scientists are able to predict the occurrence of violent behavior with sufficient reliabil-
ity . . . .”); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths:  The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity 
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 693 (1990) (“The voluminous litera-
ture examining the ability of psychiatrists (or other mental health professionals) to 
predict dangerousness in the indeterminate future has been virtually unanimous:  ‘psy-
chiatrists have absolutely no expertise in predicting dangerous behavior . . . .’” (foot-
note omitted) (quoting Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presump-
tion of Expertise:  Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 734-35 (1974))). 
42 Some commentators have argued for the wholesale exclusion of expert testi-
mony on the issue of future dangerousness.  See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 19, at 452 
(contending that experts should not be permitted to testify that an acquittee is dan-
gerous, but rather that experts should only be permitted to give their opinions on the 
relationship between the acquittee’s dangerousness and mental illness, as well as the 
effectiveness of a treatment program in remedying the acquittee’s dangerousness).  
Others have argued that experts should only be permitted to make predictions if they 
are based on “hard, methodologically sound quantitative data” rather than clinical 
judgment.  E.g., Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science:  An Analysis of 
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 620 (1978).  For another proposed solution 
to the problem of inaccurate expert predictions, see Slobogin, supra note 7, at 527 
n.158 (advocating a rule that would allow the admission of clinical predictions of dan-
gerousness only if the defendant introduces expert testimony on the issue first). 
43 Morse, supra note 32, at 128 n.44. 
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ance is the most effective means of avoiding relapse.44  Frequently, an 
acquittee’s failure to consistently take her medication results in a “re-
volving door” patient: 
After being involuntarily hospitalized and stabilized on medication, such 
patients no longer meet the dangerous criterion for commitment.  
Sometime after release, however, they start to question both the value 
and necessity of their medications and eventually stop taking them.  Pre-
dictably, their condition deteriorates to the point at which they again re-
quire inpatient care.  For too many patients, this becomes a vicious cycle 
that is never broken.
45
Such patients, once released into society, are essentially “time bombs 
ready to explode.”46 
A number of reasons may explain an insanity acquittee’s failure to 
continue her course of medication after leaving the hospital.  The 
most commonly cited include “the many unpleasant side effects pre-
sent in most of the medications, forgetfulness, a feeling of improved 
condition due to the medications that makes [her] believe [she] is no 
longer ill, . . . or a simple desire not to be medicated.”47  Although 
many patients may harbor negative attitudes toward antipsychotic 
medication, medication compliance is an indispensable feature of re-
ducing insanity acquittee recidivism, and is a main focus of this Com-
ment. 
II.  CURRENT APPROACHES TO REDUCING 
INSANITY ACQUITTEE RECIDIVISM 
Current efforts to reduce insanity acquittee recidivism may be di-
vided into two general categories:  those that seek to enhance post-
release medication compliance directly, and those that attack the va-
lidity of the insanity defense itself. 
 
44 See Veronica J. Manahan, When Our System of Involuntary Civil Commitment Fails 
Individuals with Mental Illness:  Russell Weston and the Case for Effective Monitoring and 
Medication Delivery Mechanisms, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 20 (2004) (“Systems that are 
successful in keeping individuals with mental illness out of the hospital have found 
medication compliance to be the single most important factor in achieving such suc-
cess.”). 
45 Ronald L. Wisor Jr., Community Care, Competition and Coercion:  A Legal Perspective 
on Privatized Mental Health Care, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 159-60 (1993) (footnotes omit-
ted). 
46 Brown & Wittner, supra note 1, at 356 (quoting DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 1, 1978, at 
47). 
47 Manahan, supra note 44, at 20 (footnote omitted). 
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A.  Approaches Aimed at Enhancing Medication Compliance 
Since the advent of psychotropic medication, states have grappled 
with the problem of ensuring that insanity acquittees abide by their 
treatment regimens after release.  Two primary methods of dealing 
with medication noncompliance have gained popular support in a 
number of states:  taking medication compliance into account in mak-
ing release decisions, and implementing conditional release pro-
grams. 
1.  Taking Medication Compliance into Account  
in Making Release Decisions 
Courts that take medication compliance into account in making 
release decisions will assess the acquittee’s sanity and dangerousness 
by (1) evaluating the acquittee in an unmedicated state, or (2) defin-
ing dangerousness in terms of post-release medication compliance. 
a.  Evaluating the Acquittee in an Unmedicated State 
In an effort to minimize insanity acquittee recidivism, a minority 
of courts, in making release determinations, will consider whether the 
acquittee’s mental stability or nondangerousness is solely dependent 
upon continued compliance with a medication regimen.  In State v. 
Zarrella, a Rhode Island superior court held that when deciding if an 
acquittee should be released from PIAC, “medication and treatment 
should [not] be considered on the issue of either present sanity or 
dangerousness.”48
Although adopting such an approach will most likely reduce in-
sanity acquittee recidivism, it is highly problematic because it will re-
sult in the indefinite commitment of a significant number of acquit-
tees who are capable of functioning safely in society if properly 
medicated.  A substantial percentage of insanity acquittees suffer from 
a psychotic mental disorder.49  Psychosis refers to a mental state char-
 
48 No. P2/82-1885, 1984 WL 560319, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 19, 1984); see also 
State v. Johnson, 753 P.2d 154, 157 (Ariz. 1988) (stating that although the defendant’s 
schizophrenia was in remission because of treatment, the court would still consider 
him to be suffering from a mental illness); People v. De Anda, 114 Cal. App. 3d 480, 
490 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that in an initial commitment hearing for an insanity ac-
quittee, “psychopharmaceutical restoration of sanity should not be considered a ‘full’ 
recovery”). 
49 See Richard A. Pasewark et al., Characteristics and Disposition of Persons Found Not 
Guilty by Reason of Insanity in New York State, 1971-1976, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 655, 658 
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acterized by a gross loss of contact with reality, and it is a feature of 
various mental disorders, including schizophrenia, schizoaffective dis-
order, and delusional disorder.50  Antipsychotic medications have a 
“powerful ameliorative effect on active psychotic symptoms”51 and are 
the most effective treatments known to date for such illnesses.52
The average insanity acquittee will be treated with antipsychotic 
medication during her post-acquittal commitment.53  In most cases, 
after an initial phase of trial and error,54 the treating medical profes-
sionals will settle upon an effective course of medication that success-
fully alleviates or substantially reduces the patient’s psychotic symp-
toms and ultimately restores her sanity.55
Requiring such a patient to demonstrate her sanity in an unmedi-
cated state will likely be unsuccessful.  The mental health community 
has yet to develop an effective, nonpharmacological means of restor-
ing a psychotic patient’s mental health.56  Thus, it will essentially be 
impossible for a substantial number of acquittees ever to establish 
their sanity if they are evaluated without medication.  “[I]t is senseless 
to deny persons fully functional on medication their rightful place in 
(1979) (finding that approximately seventy percent of insanity acquittees studied in 
New York between 1971 and 1976 suffered from psychosis); Jeffrey L. Rogers et al., In-
sanity Defenses:  Contested or Conceded?, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 885, 886 (1984) (noting 
that seventy percent of insanity acquittees in Oregon between 1978 and 1981 suffered 
from psychosis).
50 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 312, 323, 329 (4th ed. 2000) (listing the diagnostic criteria for 
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and delusional disorder). 
51 Marnie E. Rice et al., Treatment for Forensic Patients, in MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW:  
RESEARCH, POLICY AND SERVICES 141, 169 (Bruce D. Sales & Saleem A. Shah eds., 
1996). 
52 See MELISSA K. SPEAKING, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, SCHIZOPHRENIA 13 
(Aug. 2002), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/NIMHschizoph.pdf (“An-
tipsychotic drugs are the best treatment [for schizophrenia] now available . . . .”); cf. 
Manahan, supra note 44, at 20 (“[S]ixty to seventy-five percent of [schizophrenics] who 
stop taking their [antipsychotic] medication relapse within a year’s time.”). 
53 One of the main goals of PIAC is treatment of the acquittee’s mental illness.  
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).  Medication is an essential component 
of treatment.  See People v. Williams, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 1482 (Ct. App. 1988) (not-
ing that the purpose of PIAC is treatment “including medication”). 
54 See RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM:  CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 27-28 (4th ed. 2004) (“The neuroleptic of choice for any given pa-
tient must be determined to a considerable degree by trial and error.”). 
55 See id. at 38 (noting that traditional antipsychotic medication will help seventy-
five percent of schizophrenics improve). 
56 Cf. SPEAKING, supra note 52, at 17 (noting “[f]ar higher relapse rates . . . when 
medication is discontinued”). 
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the community . . . .”57  Moreover, evaluating acquittees in an un-
medicated state provides acquittees with the perverse incentive to 
“gamble” with their mental health and stop taking their medication.58  
This is an inappropriate and ineffective response to the recidivism di-
lemma. 
In addition, assessing the sanity of the acquittee in an unmedi-
cated state is inconsistent with the way the law evaluates mentally dis-
ordered offenders in other contexts.  When determining if a defen-
dant is competent to stand trial or face execution, many courts do not 
differentiate between unmedicated competence and medicated com-
petence.59  In fact, the Supreme Court has held that under certain cir-
cumstances, states may forcibly medicate an incompetent defendant 
for the sole purpose of restoring her competence to stand trial.60
Admittedly, competency and sanity are different mental condi-
tions,61 and states are not compelled to adopt uniform standards to 
57 Williams, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 1482. 
58 Id. 
59 See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
restoring an inmate’s competency to be executed by medicating him did not violate 
the Eighth Amendment or principles of due process); State v. Hampton, 218 So. 2d 
311, 312 (La. 1969) (observing that to find a defendant incompetent to stand trial 
merely because her competence was chemically induced would “erase improvement[s] 
produced by medical science”). 
60 In Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “the Constitution permits 
the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill de-
fendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent 
to stand trial.”  539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).  In order to forcibly medicate, the following 
conditions must be met:  (1) the treatment must be medically appropriate; (2) the 
treatment must be “substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the 
fairness of the trial”; and (3) taking into account less intrusive alternatives, the treat-
ment must be “necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related 
interests.”  Id.  The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the state may forcibly 
medicate a mentally ill defendant for the sole purpose of restoring the defendant’s 
competence to be executed.  Lower courts are divided on the issue.  Compare Singleton, 
319 F.3d at 1024-25 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that under certain circumstances an in-
competent defendant may be forcibly medicated in order to restore her competence 
to be executed), with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 761 (La. 1992) (ruling, with some 
consideration of United States Supreme Court precedent that interprets analogous 
provisions of the United States Constitution, that the forcible medication of an incom-
petent defendant for the sole purpose of restoring competence to be executed is cruel 
and unusual punishment under Louisiana’s constitution). 
61 A person may be sane but incompetent, or competent but insane.  To be found 
competent to stand trial, the defendant must be able to reasonably assist counsel and 
must possess “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him.”  Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The test for insanity varies among jurisdictions.  The federal test provides 
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govern both of them.  Furthermore, from a pragmatic viewpoint, it 
makes perfect sense to evaluate a defendant’s competence in a medi-
cated state but to assess an acquittee’s sanity in an unmedicated state; 
public safety is implicated in the latter context, but not the former.  
However, the mere fact that states are permitted to forcibly administer 
antipsychotic drugs to incompetent defendants suggests that psycho-
tropic medication plays an invaluable role in restoring the mental 
health of mentally ill individuals.  It is inconsistent to allow the state to 
benefit from the effectiveness of antipsychotic medication in the 
competency context, but to withhold the same benefit from the ac-
quittee in the insanity release context. 
b.  Assessing Future Dangerousness in Terms of Post-Release Medication Compliance 
Other courts have concluded that an insanity acquittee’s likeli-
hood of complying with a treatment program and her history of prior 
relapses are appropriate factors to consider when determining if the 
acquittee should be released.62  The Nebraska legislature considered a 
similar approach in 1993 by proposing a bill that purported to 
“make[] failure to comply with treatment or to take prescribed medi-
cation appropriate evidence for the court to consider in assessing [an 
acquittee’s] dangerousness.”63
Considering whether an acquittee is likely to comply with a treat-
ment regimen is a logical means of minimizing insanity acquittee re-
cidivism.  If post-release medication noncompliance substantially con-
tributes to such recidivism, then courts should be able to take this 
factor into account when determining whether an insanity acquittee 
will pose a danger to society upon release.  In practice, however, pre-
that a defendant is legally insane if “the defendant, as a result of a severe mental dis-
ease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of 
his acts.”  18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000). 
62 See Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 n.4 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[I]f an ac-
quittee is no longer dangerous only because he or she is on medication or in a struc-
tured environment, then clearly whether he or she will take his or her medication or 
be in a structured environment after release can and should be considered prior to 
release.”); State v. Rambin, 427 So. 2d 1248, 1253 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (denying the ac-
quittee’s application for release from PIAC because, among other reasons, he exhib-
ited a propensity to resist medication); In re Francis S., 663 N.E.2d 881, 884 (N.Y. 1995) 
(noting that, in making release decisions, courts may take into account an acquittee’s 
“history of prior relapses into violent behavior and of recurrent substance abuse and 
noncompliance with treatment programs”). 
63 Sherin S. Vitro, Comment, Promoting Therepeutic Objectives Through LB 518:  A 
Sane Amendment to Nebraska Law Governing the Disposition of Insanity Acquittees, 72 NEB. L. 
REV. 837, 856 (1993).  The bill was never signed into law. 
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dicting whether an acquittee will continue to take her medication is 
quite difficult and may result in the unjustified and inequitable con-
finement of acquittees.  As Part I.A discussed, mental health experts 
often make inaccurate predictions and, if anything, tend to overpre-
dict the future dangerousness of insanity acquittees.64
Moreover, courts often rely on weak evidence in predicting future 
compliance, particularly in the case of first-time insanity acquittees 
where courts do not have a history of compliance to consider in evalu-
ating the acquittee.65  For example, in State v. Perez, the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana held that an insanity acquittee’s petition for condi-
tional release was properly denied because if the acquittee “stop[ped] 
taking [her] medication, [she] could become mentally ill again . . . 
[and] could discontinue [her] medication at any time.”66  But the fact 
that an insanity acquittee could stop taking her medication at any time 
merely establishes that the acquittee has free will.  It does not establish 
that, if released, an acquittee would stop taking her medication.  Re-
fusing to release an acquittee on the basis of such tenuous evidence is 
inequitable, particularly in the case of Ricky Perez, who, as the evi-
dence established, had been “a model patient for over eleven years” 
and had “successfully functioned in society as a peaceful, law abiding 
citizen while on many weekend and ten day passes.”67
Furthermore, in the cases in which an insanity acquittee has al-
ready been deemed sane,68 it is unnecessary to assess the acquittee’s 
dangerousness and thus take medication compliance into account.  
64 See Donald H.J. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment:  A Critique of 
Revisions in Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commit-
ment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 83, 98 (1986) (“Empirical studies reveal that psychiatrists and 
sociologists are notoriously inaccurate at predicting dangerousness and in fact have a 
pronounced tendency to overpredict.”); Morse, supra note 42, at 598 (“Nearly always, 
professionals err in the direction of overpredicting the occurrence of legally relevant be-
havior, of overproducing false positives.”); Henry J. Steadman & Joseph Cocozza, Psy-
chiatry, Dangerousness and the Repetitively Violent Offender, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
226, 231 (1978) (“Psychiatrists can demonstrate no special expertise in making predic-
tions of future violent behavior.”). 
65 Courts frequently stress the importance of an acquittee’s history of compliance 
or noncompliance when making release decisions.  See, e.g., State v. Dudley, 903 S.W.2d 
581, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (listing “whether the individual has a successful history of 
taking medication while on conditional release” as an important factor to consider 
when making a release determination). 
66 563 So. 2d 841, 845 (La. 1990). 
67 Id. at 846 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
68 Although an acquittee may have regained her sanity because of medication, this 
should not prevent her from being deemed sane for the purpose of release from PIAC.  
See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
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Only the concurrent presence of a mental illness and dangerousness 
justifies continued confinement under PIAC.69  Thus, as the dissenting 
opinion in Perez noted, if an acquittee such as Mr. Perez no longer suf-
fers from a mental illness, then the “propensity for danger alone is not 
[a] sufficient constitutional basis for [his continued] confinement.”70
Although courts may certainly take medication compliance into 
account in assessing the dangerousness of an insanity acquittee, they 
should (1) only base their predictions on substantiated evidence, such 
as an acquittee’s prior history of noncompliance or express “threats of 
future noncompliance,”71 and (2) only make such predictions when 
dangerousness is a constitutionally relevant issue (i.e., when the ac-
quittee has not been deemed sane). 
2.  Implementing Conditional Release Programs 
In recent years, a number of states72 and Congress73 have adopted 
statutes providing for the conditional release of insanity acquittees 
from the hospital.  Conditional release statutes generally “authorize 
the release of an insanity acquittee upon such conditions of medical 
care or treatment as the court deems appropriate to ensure that the 
acquittee will not present a danger to himself or others, such as a regi-
men of medication.”74  If an acquittee fails to abide by the prescribed 
treatment regimen, the state may revoke the conditional release and 
rehospitalize the acquittee.75
Upon first glance, conditional release programs seem to be a logi-
cal response to the problem of insanity acquittee recidivism.  Closer 
examination of conditional releases, however, reveals that they can be 
constitutionally problematic.  Before evaluating the flaws of condi-
tional release provisions, it is important to reiterate the constitutional 
standard for PIAC:  “[D]ue process requires that the nature and dura-
69 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992), that a state may not confine an 
insanity acquittee who, though possibly dangerous, is no longer mentally ill). 
70 Perez, 563 So. 2d at 846 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
71 In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 481 (N.Y. 1995). 
72 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1602–1603 (West 2000) (providing for conditional 
release); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-411 (1993 & Supp. 2000) (same). 
73 See 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f) (2000) (establishing a federal conditional release provi-
sion). 
74 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 89 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
75 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4243(g) (2000) (providing for revocation of conditional 
discharge). 
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tion of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for 
which the individual is committed.”76  In the PIAC context, the pur-
pose for committing the acquittee is to deal nonpunitively with her 
mental illness and dangerousness.  Thus, if either the acquittee’s illness 
or her dangerousness is alleviated, the state loses any interest in con-
tinuing to confine the acquittee under the rubric of PIAC.  Insanity 
and dangerousness are two distinct concepts and only their concur-
rent presence justifies commitment.77  All too often, courts and legis-
latures conflate the two concepts, defining insanity in terms of dan-
gerousness and vice versa.78  Although insanity and dangerousness 
may be interrelated in some individuals, that is not always the case; it 
is perfectly plausible for a person to be sane and dangerous or insane 
and nondangerous. 
The conditional release of insanity acquittees can violate the con-
stitutional standard for PIAC in a number of important ways.  First, 
under some conditional release statutes, an insanity acquittee must be 
found nondangerous before the state will conditionally release her.79  
“[N]o trial judge in his or her right mind would release a patient to 
outpatient status on the theory that, because of the supervision and 
treatment the patient is supposed to receive, he or she will no longer 
be dangerous to others.”80
76 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
77 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992), that a state may not confine an 
insanity acquittee who, though possibly dangerous, is no longer mentally ill). 
78 For example, the California conditional release statute defines sanity as no 
longer being “a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, dis-
ease, or disorder.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(e) (West Supp. 2005). 
79 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.040.14 (West 2002) (“No committed person shall 
be conditionally released until it is determined that the committed person is not likely 
to be dangerous to others while on conditional release.”).  Some states do not require 
a finding of nondangerousness before an acquittee may be conditionally released.  For 
example, Hawaii’s conditional release statute provides that if an acquittee is found to 
be either nondangerous or not mentally ill, she must be unconditionally released.  HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 704-411 (1993 & Supp 2000).  She may be conditionally released if she is 
mentally ill and presents a danger to herself or others, but can be “controlled ade-
quately and given proper care, supervision, and treatment.”  Id.  Hawaii’s conditional 
release statute therefore meets the constitutional requirements set forth in Foucha be-
cause it requires both mental illness and dangerousness as a prerequisite to confine-
ment. 
80 Grant H. Morris, Placed in Purgatory:  Conditional Release of Insanity Acquittees, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1107 (1997) (citing People v. Harner, 262 Cal. Rptr. 422, 431 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (Kline, J., dissenting)). 
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But, if the acquittee is adjudged nondangerous at the end of her 
inpatient commitment, then the state has no further interest in limit-
ing the acquittee’s liberty, as an inpatient or an outpatient.  Although 
the state may wish to monitor the acquittee to ensure that she is in fact 
nondangerous, it may not do so by prolonging PIAC—even on an 
outpatient basis—when the initial justificatory grounds for commit-
ment (i.e., concurrent presence of insanity and dangerousness) no 
longer exist.  The state could resort to civil commitment if the requi-
site criteria were met,81 but PIAC of any form would no longer be 
permissible. 
Second, even if the initial conditional release could be construed 
as constitutional, the revocation procedures followed in many states 
certainly are not.  The California statute governing revocation of con-
ditional release does not require a finding of dangerousness before 
the acquittee may be rehospitalized.82  In In re McPherson, an appellate 
court in California held that the statute’s failure to require a finding 
of dangerousness was not the result of a “legislative oversight.”83  
Rather, the court noted, the state may revoke an insanity acquittee’s 
conditional release upon determining that the acquittee “requires ex-
tended inpatient treatment” or that she “refuses to accept further 
outpatient treatment and supervision.”84  Under the California court’s 
interpretation of the statute, therefore, dangerousness is not a pre-
requisite to recommitment.85
In response to the California courts’ interpretation of the state’s 
conditional release statute, the San Diego County Conditional Release 
Program (CONREP) has revoked the conditional release status of ac-
quittees who never violated the law while they were outpatients.86  
Quite often, CONREP has based its revocation decisions on the suspi-
81 See infra note 91 (describing the criteria for involuntary civil commitment). 
82 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1608 (West 2000) (providing for judicially determined 
revocation when the treatment supervisor finds that the acquittee requires extended 
inpatient treatment or refuses to accept further outpatient treatment and supervision). 
83 176 Cal. App. 3d 332, 339 (Ct. App. 1985). 
84 Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1608). 
85 Although a finding of dangerousness is not a necessary prerequisite to revoca-
tion under the California conditional release statute, it is a permissible consideration.  
See, e.g., People v. DeGuzman, 33 Cal. App. 4th 414, 420 (Ct. App. 1995) (upholding 
the trial court’s decision to revoke an acquittee’s conditional release status in part be-
cause he “posed a possible danger to public safety”). 
86 See Morris, supra note 80, at 1095 (noting cases in which CONREP recom-
mended “revocation of outpatient status . . . for patients who had not engaged in 
criminal activity”). 
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cion that an insanity acquittee is no longer taking her antipsychotic 
medication or regularly attending therapy sessions.87  In one case, 
“CONREP sought revocation of [an acquittee’s] outpatient status even 
though the patient had not committed any criminal act or violated 
any terms and conditions of his outpatient status.”88  In justifying the 
revocation, CONREP asserted that the acquittee lacked insight into 
his mental disorder and was “medically fragile.”89
California’s approach to the revocation of an insanity acquittee’s 
conditional release status is unconstitutional.  As previously noted, the 
state’s nonpunitive interest in confining and monitoring an insanity 
acquittee is inextricably tied to the continued existence of a mental 
disorder that renders the acquittee dangerous.  If the acquittee is sim-
ply mentally ill, but not dangerous, the state’s PIAC interest is termi-
nated.90  The state may pursue civil commitment if its law permits the 
involuntary commitment of a nondangerous mentally ill person for 
the purpose of treatment.91  However, PIAC in any form for an acquit-
tee who is no longer dangerous is impermissible. 
A third critique of the conditional release system is that by “re-
tain[ing] indeterminate control over insanity acquittees . . . [it] in-
flicts impermissible punishment” on a group of offenders who have 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that they are not criminally re-
sponsible.92  Most conditional release programs require that acquittees 
live in a particular residence, take certain medications, receive therapy 
at specified times and places, refrain from the use of alcohol and 
87 See id. (describing revocation based on CONREP’s belief that an acquittee was 
not receiving treatment). 
88 Id. at 1096-97. 
89 Id. at 1096. 
90 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (stating the constitutional prerequi-
sites for confinement). 
91 Civil commitment is the involuntary treatment or care of mentally disabled per-
sons outside of the criminal context.  REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 666.  Civil com-
mitment laws come in two varieties:  the police power model and the parens patriae 
model.  See generally id. at 678-746.  Statutes rooted in the state’s police powers permit 
the commitment of a person who “as a result of mental illness . . . is dangerous to oth-
ers or to self.”  Id. at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Almost every state has a 
civil commitment law based on the police power model.  Approximately twenty-five 
states also have parens patriae commitment laws, which “permit commitment of a men-
tally ill person who is shown to be, as a result of mental illness, unable to provide for 
his or her basic needs, gravely disabled or likely to deteriorate.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
92 Morris, supra note 80, at 1113. 
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drugs, and remain in the county and/or state at all times.93  These 
stringent requirements, combined with the fact that conditional re-
lease decisions are often made in an arbitrary and unconstitutional 
manner,94 render the conditional release system more punitive than 
rehabilitative.95
Although parole and conditional release are theoretically dis-
tinct,96 in practice they are sometimes indistinguishable.  For example, 
studies have shown that insanity acquittees who committed homicide 
are kept on conditional release for longer periods of time than per-
sons acquitted of less serious crimes.97  As Professor Grant H. Morris 
has noted, “[p]erhaps these data suggest that decisions to retain pa-
tients in [conditional release] are unduly influenced by a charge of 
homicide that resulted in an insanity acquittal.”98  If this is so, then 
93 See id. at 1092-93 (describing the general mandates of conditional release pro-
grams). 
94 See supra text accompanying notes 79-91 (describing how revocation decisions 
are often made without regard for the constitutional requirement that the state may 
only exercise control over insanity acquittees who are both mentally ill and danger-
ous). 
95 The primary purpose of a punitive system is to punish an offender for commit-
ting a specific crime.  See generally REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 525-27 (discussing 
rationales for criminal punishment based on the commission of a particular act).  Sys-
tems that govern the release of insanity acquittees may not be punitive in nature be-
cause the acquittee has not been found guilty of committing a crime and therefore 
may not be punished.  Rather, one of the main reasons the acquittee is confined is so 
that she may be rehabilitated.  See id. at 530-31 (implying that confinement provides for 
rehabilitation and incapacitation).  Rehabilitation focuses on helping the acquittee 
through counseling, medication, training, etc., to change her behavior so that she may 
be safely reintegrated into society. 
96 See Bergstein v. State, 588 A.2d 779, 783-84 (Md. 1991) (“[T]here are significant 
differences between . . . conditional release and . . . parole or probation.  Parole and 
probation are essentially a product of punitive sanctions imposed for the commission 
of a criminal act . . . . Conditional release, however, is not a tool of the penal system.  
Rather, it is a therapeutic release . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
97 See Morris, supra note 80, at 1083-84 (noting the high proportion of CONREP 
patients who were acquitted of homicide as opposed to other crimes). 
98 Id.  It is certainly possible that insanity acquittees who committed homicide suf-
fer from more severe and pervasive mental disorders and are therefore more danger-
ous than acquittees who commit minor offenses.  However, courts sometimes consider 
the fact that the acquittee committed a homicide to be the “foremost” piece of evi-
dence in assessing the acquittee’s current dangerousness.  See, e.g., Warren v. Harvey, 
632 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir. 1980) (pointing out that the acquittee had already “commit-
ted the most extreme form of violence”); State v. Perez, 563 So. 2d 841, 845 (La. 1990) 
(“When the crime is a serious one like murder, a court should be especially cautious 
before releasing an insanity acquittee.”).  These courts will also discount the fact that a 
homicidal acquittee has not behaved violently while committed, noting that the acquit-
tee has been in custody and thus her dangerousness cannot be properly assessed.  See, 
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states are employing conditional release as a punitive—rather than a 
rehabilitative—means of dealing with acquittees.  This approach di-
rectly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s holding in Jones: 
[Because the acquittee] was not convicted, he may not be punished.  His 
confinement rests on his continuing illness and dangerousness.  Thus, 
. . . no matter how serious the act committed by the acquittee, he may be 
released . . . if he has recovered.  In contrast, one who committed a less 
serious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill and 
dangerous.  There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of 
the offense and length of time necessary for recovery.
99
Thus, although conditional release seems to be a practical solu-
tion to the problem of insanity acquittee recidivism, certain release 
statutes violate the constitutional standards for acquittee commitment 
established in Jones and Foucha and are impermissibly penal in nature. 
B.  Approaches that Attack the Validity of the Insanity Defense Itself 
The second general category of approaches to reducing insanity 
acquittee recidivism entails modification of the insanity defense itself.  
Modifications include adoption of the guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) 
verdict and complete abolishment of the insanity defense. 
1.  The Adoption of the Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict 
In response to highly publicized violent acts of recidivism commit-
ted by insanity acquittees,100 several states adopted the GBMI verdict as 
an alternative to a finding of legal insanity.101  The GBMI verdict per-
e.g., Warren, 632 F.2d at 934 (“[T]he lack of evidence that appellant has engaged in 
more recent violent acts or threats must be viewed in light of the fact that he has been 
in custody ever since he killed his neighbor.”).  Although the commission of a prior 
violent act is certainly probative of current dangerousness, it cannot be the sole piece 
of evidence relied upon by courts.  If that were the case, then acquittees who commit-
ted homicide would be deemed perpetually dangerous, regardless of the strides they 
made while committed.  The fact that some courts rely on an acquittee’s prior homi-
cide as the “foremost” piece of evidence in assessing an acquittee’s current dangerous-
ness suggests that the motivation behind the confinement may be more punitive than 
rehabilitative. 
99 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983) (footnote omitted). 
100 See supra text accompanying notes 1-7 (discussing violent recidivist acts by two 
insanity acquittees and the resulting public outcry). 
101 For statutes defining the GBMI verdict, see, for example, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
504.130 (LexisNexis 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 2000); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 23A-26-14 (2004). 
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mits a jury to find that a defendant is mentally ill, yet criminally re-
sponsible for the crime charged.102  The defendant must then receive 
proper psychological treatment while imprisoned.103
The GBMI verdict is a “useless, confusing alternative” to the insan-
ity defense.104  A mentally ill defendant who does not meet the legal 
criteria for insanity and is convicted of a crime will receive psy-
chopharmacological treatment in prison regardless of the availability of a 
GBMI verdict.105  Thus, there is no meaningful distinction between a 
defendant who receives a GBMI verdict and one who receives a 
straightforward guilty verdict.  In fact, in some jurisdictions, a person 
receiving a GBMI verdict may even be executed.106
The only plausible explanation for the widespread adoption of the 
GBMI verdict is that legislatures hope it will induce juries to return 
GBMI verdicts in cases where they ordinarily would have acquitted the 
defendant by reason of insanity.107  “[I]mpermissibly allow[ing] juries 
102 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314(a) (West 2002) (“A person . . . may be 
found ‘guilty but mentally ill’ at trial if the trier of fact finds, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the person is guilty of an offense, was mentally ill at the time of the com-
mission of the offense and was not legally insane at th[at] time . . . .”). 
103 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9727(b) (West 2002) (“An offender who is 
severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment at the time of sentencing shall, 
consistent with available resources, be provided such treatment as is psychiatrically or 
psychologically indicated for his mental illness.”). 
104 Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses:  A Legal and Conceptual 
Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 401 (1998).  According to Professor Christopher Slobo-
gin, proponents of the GBMI verdict contend that it will (1) “reduce, if not eliminate, 
inappropriate insanity acquittals”; (2) “prevent, or at least postpone, the further com-
mission of violent acts by mentally ill individuals”; (3) “assur[e] more effective treat-
ment for mentally ill offenders”; and (4) “discourag[e] the insanity plea” thereby 
minimizing battles between experts.  Slobogin, supra note 7, at 505.  For an analysis of 
the GBMI verdict’s failure to fulfill these goals, see id. at 506-17. 
105 See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 512-13 (providing examples from Illinois and 
Indiana of laws requiring the Department of Corrections to provide psychiatric treat-
ment for prisoners who require it); see also Gare A. Smith & James A. Hall, Evaluating 
Michigan’s Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict:  An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 77, 
104-05 (1982) (finding that the “GBMI prisoner is not more likely to receive mental 
health treatment than the prisoner with a simple guilty verdict; the GBMI prisoner in 
Michigan is tested and evaluated like any other prisoner” (footnote omitted)). 
106 See People v. Crews, 522 N.E.2d 1167, 1172-75 (Ill. 1988) (holding that a verdict 
of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude the trial judge from sentencing a defendant 
to death because GBMI is not the equivalent of an insanity plea and the legislature did 
not intend such preclusion). 
107 Although one of the goals of the GBMI verdict is to decrease the number of 
“not guilty by reason of insanity” verdicts, research suggests that “most defendants 
found GBMI would probably have received guilty verdicts in the absence of the GBMI 
statute.”  Smith & Hall, supra note 105, at 104. 
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to avoid finding a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity in cases in 
which legal insanity appears justified”108 is an inappropriate means of 
reducing insanity acquittee recidivism.  If the insanity defense is avail-
able and the defendant meets the requisite criteria, then she should 
be able to take full advantage of it.  The GBMI verdict distracts juries 
from evaluating the appropriateness of the insanity defense in a par-
ticular case and dupes them into believing that they are striking a fair 
balance between public safety and the mental health needs of the de-
fendant.  In reality, they may be imprisoning defendants who do not 
meet the requirements for criminal responsibility. 
2.  Complete Abolishment of the Insanity Defense 
Four states have completely abolished the insanity defense and 
admit evidence of mental illness only to negate mens rea.109  Complete 
abolishment of the insanity defense is an overreaction to the recidi-
vism problem.  It fails to take into account the fact that some offend-
ers are truly not capable of rational thought and are thus unable to be 
deterred by the criminal law.  In an effort to protect public safety, 
such an approach utterly ignores the mental capacity of the offender 
and inappropriately attaches criminal blame and punishment to un-
deserving defendants. 
Admitting evidence of mental illness to negate criminal intent is 
an inadequate replacement for the insanity defense.  To be acquitted 
under this approach, a defendant must establish that her mental in-
capacity prevented her from formulating the requisite mens rea to 
commit the crime.110  The classic example is the man who strangles his 
108 Morse, supra note 104, at 401. 
109 Kansas, Montana, Idaho, and Utah have passed legislation abolishing the insan-
ity defense and providing that evidence of mental illness may only be admitted to ne-
gate a defendant’s mens rea.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2004) (establishing a 
mental disease or defect as defenses to prosecution insofar as they negate the mental 
state element(s) of the crime charged); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995) (same); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (2003) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West 
2003) (same).  The highest court of each of the four states has upheld the constitu-
tionality of the abolishment.  See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 919 (Idaho 1990) (rul-
ing that the availability of the insanity defense is not guaranteed by the state constitu-
tion); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851 (Kan. 2003) (same); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 
992, 1002 (Mont. 1984) (same); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 366 (Utah 1995) 
(same).  But see Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 80 (Nev. 2001) (finding that the abolish-
ment of the insanity defense violated federal due process). 
110 See Marc Rosen, Student Article, Insanity Denied:  Abolition of the Insanity Defense 
in Kansas, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 255 (1999) (“This approach permits a defen-
dant to introduce expert psychiatric witnesses or evidence to litigate the intent ele-
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wife to death, but—as a result of mental illness—believes that he is 
squeezing a lemon.111  His mental illness prevents him from possessing 
the intent to kill, and the mens rea necessary for homicide is negated.  
But in reality, “defendants rarely lack mens rea because they believe 
they are squeezing a lemon.”112  Rather, most mentally ill defendants 
commit crimes intentionally, but do so for crazy reasons (e.g., they 
heard voices commanding them to kill).113  Thus, the mens rea ap-
proach is an unsatisfactory alternative to the insanity defense and “un-
fairly punishes people who are completely unable to understand the 
nature and consequences of their actions.”114
*      *      * 
Thus far, I have examined five approaches adopted by states to 
reduce insanity acquittee recidivism.  The first three approaches aim 
at ensuring that insanity acquittees abide by their medication regimen 
after release.115  I concluded that evaluating acquittees in an unmedi-
cated state when making release decisions is both impractical and in-
equitable.  The remaining two methods (taking medication compli-
ance into account when assessing the dangerousness of an acquittee 
and implementing conditional release programs) are effective means 
of reducing insanity acquittee recidivism, but only if they are applied 
in an equitable fashion and in accordance with constitutional 
norms.116
In addition, I have concluded that the two methods that attack the 
validity of the insanity defense itself (the GBMI verdict and the com-
plete abolition of the insanity defense) are inadequate.117  Studies of 
the GBMI verdict demonstrate that it does not alter the number of in-
ments of the crime.  If the evidence negates the requisite intent, the defendant is enti-
tled to an acquittal.”). 
111 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 2 (1980) (providing the lemon example).
112 Rosen, supra note 110, at 261 (emphasis omitted). 
113 See id. at 261 (“[E]vidence of mental disease or defect would still be of no help 
since the hearing of voices has nothing to do with whether [a defendant] acted with 
intent, purposefully or knowingly.”); see also, Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy:  The 
Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 801-02 (1985) (“[V]irtually all crazy 
persons know, in the strictest sense, what they are doing and intend to do it.  A person 
who kills another because of a delusional belief is aware of killing a human being and 
does so intentionally.”). 
114 Rosen, supra note 110, at 262. 
115 See supra Part II.A.1.a–b, II.A.2. 
116 See supra Part II.A.1.b, II.A.2. 
117 See supra Part II.B.1–2. 
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dividuals found not guilty by reason of insanity, and thus it has no ef-
fect on the rate of insanity acquittee recidivism.118  Even if the GBMI 
verdict reduced the number of acquittals by reason of insanity, it 
would do so at the unjustifiable cost of imprisoning individuals who 
are not criminally responsible for their actions.  Similarly, abolishing 
the insanity defense places criminal blame and punishment on an un-
deserving class of offenders. 
III.  A NEW APPROACH TO INSANITY ACQUITTEE RECIDIVISM 
I propose a new means of dealing with insanity acquittee recidi-
vism which, in conjunction with certain methods currently employed 
by the states,119 would serve as an effective “external accountability 
control[]”120 for acquittees.  Before I set forth my proposal, it is neces-
sary to delineate five key assumptions that I have made in its develop-
ment. 
A.  The Assumptions 
First, the insanity defense is a valid affirmative defense.  Although 
opponents of the insanity defense claim that it produces inaccurate 
verdicts, is overused, and permits guilty people to avoid punish-
ment,121 such criticism is untenable.122  In our society, “[c]onviction 
118 See supra note 107 (citing research suggesting that most defendants found 
GBMI would probably have received guilty verdicts in the absence of the GBMI stat-
ute).  If individuals who would have otherwise been found guilty are imprisoned under 
a verdict of GBMI, then it is not exerting any deterrent effect on insane acquittees. 
119 Such methods include implementing conditional release programs that are 
constitutionally appropriate or assessing the acquittee’s dangerousness on the basis of 
firm evidence and only when the issue is constitutionally relevant.  See, e.g., supra note 
79 (arguing that Hawaii’s conditional release statute meets the constitutional require-
ments as set forth in Foucha); cf. supra text accompanying notes 64-70 (discussing 
courts’ use of medication compliance evidence in determining whether an acquittee 
should be conditionally released). 
120 State v. Dudley, 903 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
121 For example, former Attorney General Edwin Meese argued that abolishing the 
insanity defense would “rid . . . the streets of some of the most dangerous people that 
are out there and committing a disproportionate number of crimes.”  See MICHAEL L. 
PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 18 (1994) (quoting Reagan Ad-
viser Meese Enunciates Administration’s Crime Control Goals, 12 CRIM. JUST. NEWSLETTER 4 
(1981)). 
122 See id. at 73-142, 229-62 (1994) (explaining why avoidance of punishment is an 
erroneously perceived result of the insanity defense); see also Morse, supra note 113, at 
797 (“Insanity acquittals are far too infrequent to communicate the message that the 
criminal justice system is ‘soft’ or fails to protect society.”). 
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and punishment are justified only if the defendant deserves them.”123  
The “actor’s responsibility as a moral agent” is a “basic precondition 
for desert.”124  Thus, if a person, because of a severe mental illness, 
does not possess the requisite capacity for rationality, she cannot be 
considered responsible for her actions or deserving of criminal blame 
and punishment.  The insanity defense properly reflects the notion 
that a defendant whose mental disorder renders her irresponsible is 
not in fact culpable. 
Second, there are genuine differences between convicting a de-
fendant and sending her to jail, and acquitting a defendant by reason 
of insanity and hospitalizing her.  In the case of the convicted defen-
dant, society has deemed her criminally responsible for her actions.  
Because she is fully culpable for her behavior, society may “extin-
guish” her “right to freedom from confinement” and imprison her for 
an established period of time.125  The insanity acquittee, however, has 
been found criminally nonresponsible.  The state may confine the ac-
quittee—not because she is culpable, but because she is nonresponsi-
bly dangerous.126  The length of her commitment will not depend on 
the severity of the crime she committed.127  Rather, it will “rest[] on 
[her] continuing illness and dangerousness.”128  The distinction be-
tween criminal conviction and acquittee hospitalization is significant, 
and it plays an indispensable role in my proposal. 
Third, insanity and dangerousness are two distinct concepts.  Ad-
mittedly, at the time of initial commitment, an acquittee is presumably 
both insane and dangerous.129  However, by the time the state consid-
123 Id. at 781. 
124 Id. 
125 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980). 
126 See supra text accompanying notes 76-77, 99 (explaining that acquittees may 
only be confined so long as they are both mentally ill and dangerous). 
127 Although this statement is true in theory, it is not always so in practice.  See 
Ronald Roesch & James R.P. Ogloff, Settings for Providing Criminal and Civil Forensic 
Mental Health Services, in MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW, supra note 51, at 191, 199 (noting 
a study that compared the length of time for which insanity acquittees were confined 
to the sentences of defendants who were found guilty after raising the insanity defense, 
and that the study found that insanity acquittees, with the exception of murder cases, 
were “confined for considerably longer periods of time”).  Some state statutes explicitly 
provide that “commitment of acquittees be limited to the maximum sentence the ac-
quittee would have received had he or she been found responsible for the crime 
charged.”  REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 842. 
128 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983). 
129 See id. at 363-64 (“A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two 
facts:  (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) 
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ers whether or not to release the acquittee, it is perfectly plausible that 
she may be sane and dangerous, or insane and nondangerous.  Al-
though states sometimes take one factor into account in assessing the 
existence of the other (e.g., the acquittee is still mentally ill—
therefore, she must also still be dangerous), this approach is neither 
required nor appropriate in all cases.130  The distinction between san-
ity and dangerousness is particularly important to the validity of my 
proposal because my proposal only applies to those acquittees pro-
nounced sane at the time of release.  Thus, if an acquittee is deemed 
mentally ill but nondangerous upon release, my proposal would not 
govern her post-release recidivism.131
Fourth, my proposal only reaches acquittees who are mentally ill 
when they recidivate.  Acquittees who maintain their sanity but con-
tinue to commit crimes after release are quite clearly responsible and 
should be dealt with according to the standard rules of the criminal 
justice system. 
Fifth, I am presuming that the prima facie case of the recidivist 
crime the acquittee is charged with has been proven.  Thus, the only 
element in dispute is whether the acquittee possesses a valid affirma-
tive defense based upon her mental state at the time of the crime. 
B.  The Proposal:  Abolishing the Insanity Defense for  
Certain Acquittee Recidivists 
My basic proposal is the following:  if an insanity acquittee, who is 
judged sane at the time of release from PIAC, subsequently commits a 
crime while mentally ill, she will be unable to raise the insanity de-
fense. 
he committed the act because of mental illness. . . . [T]hese findings constitute an 
adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous and mentally ill per-
son.”). 
130 See Carlisle v. State, 512 So. 2d 150, 160 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (ordering the 
release of a mentally ill but nondangerous acquittee). 
131 I believe, however, that in practice states release very few acquittees whom they 
consider to be insane but nondangerous.  Accurate dangerousness predictions are very 
difficult to make.  Clinicians will often overpredict dangerousness, “especially when the 
consequence of a finding of dangerousness is that an obviously mentally ill patient will 
remain within their control.”  Carlisle, 512 So. 2d at 159 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 378-
79) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, the mental stability of an ac-
quittee is often a factor considered in making the dangerousness prediction itself.  
Thus, although no data are currently available on this issue, I contend that nondan-
gerous, mentally ill acquittees make up a small minority of acquittees released from 
PIAC.  The scope of my proposal, then, is still quite broad and will effectively reach 
most acquittee recidivists. 
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Generally, when an insanity acquittee is released, she has been 
deemed sane by the state.132  This finding of sanity entails a recogni-
tion that the acquittee now possesses the capacity for rationality and 
the ability to be guided by reason.133  In this rational state, the acquit-
tee is capable of comprehending that she previously committed a 
crime while suffering from a severe mental disorder, and, if proper 
precautions are not taken, that she may potentially become insane 
(and dangerous) again.134  Accordingly, she must take all steps within 
her power to prevent herself from deteriorating into a state of mental 
instability.  My proposal would require the acquittee to abide by the 
following mandates upon release from PIAC. 
First, the acquittee must strictly adhere to the treatment regimen 
that was developed for her while she was hospitalized.  Medication 
compliance is the single most important factor in avoiding mental ill-
ness relapse.135  Thus, even if the acquittee dislikes the side effects of 
her medication, she must continue to take it.136  She must also comply 
with any other form of treatment that her doctors have prescribed for 
132 See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
133 Cf. Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication:  An Interpretive Theory of the In-
sanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1391 n.95 (1986) (ex-
plaining that a legally insane defendant must lack “rationality [with regard to] the 
conduct with which he is criminally charged” (citing HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEAN-
ING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 210-11 (1972))). 
134 It is often asserted that many mentally ill people (particularly schizophrenics) 
do not have insight into their disorders, and thus do not believe they are mentally ill.  
See Manahan, supra note 44, at 20 & n.123 (noting that many mentally ill people are 
not aware of their mental illness).  This should not be a concern for the group of ac-
quittees my proposal is targeting.  Once an acquittee has regained her sanity she is ca-
pable of rational thought and will thus be able to understand the effects of her illness 
and the proper ways to manage them. 
135 See id. at 20 (“Systems that are successful in keeping individuals with mental ill-
ness out of the hospital have found medication compliance to be the single most im-
portant factor in achieving such success.”). 
136 I am not minimizing the side effects that a patient may suffer from antipsy-
chotic medication.  However, the advent of atypical antipsychotic medications, which 
have a lower risk of the side effects that are generally associated with traditional medi-
cines, provides patients with less-unpleasant options.  See REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, 
at 28-29, 948-49 (discussing the impact of the new antipsychotic medications on right-
to-refuse jurisprudence); SPEAKING, supra note 52, at 18 (explaining that newer antip-
sychotic drugs have a lower risk of tardive dyskinesia, a serious side effect of traditional 
medicines).  Furthermore, “[a]lthough the side effects of medications for treatment of 
mental disorders are real and should not be underestimated, the overall benefit of the 
effectiveness of such medication in helping people with mental illness live as non-
dangerous, functioning members of society seems to outweigh the side effects’ nega-
tive impact.”  Manahan, supra note 44, at 20. 
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her (e.g., participating in cognitive behavioral therapy, self-help 
groups, or vocational training). 
In addition to rigorously adhering to a specified treatment regi-
men, the acquittee must actively work to eliminate any potentially de-
stabilizing risk factors from her life.  She must refrain from drinking 
alcohol,137 ingesting narcotics,138 and smoking nicotine.139  Regular at-
tendance at either school or work would also be mandatory.140
The state will expect the acquittee to cooperate fully with the 
above directives, and to take an active, responsible role in preserving 
her own mental health.  If the acquittee fails to do so, and she recidi-
vates, the state will hold her criminally responsible, even though she 
may be insane at the time of the recidivist crime.  Her criminal re-
sponsibility lies not in the commission of the crime itself,141 but rather 
in her failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid going insane 
again. 
Several courts have adopted a similar approach in dealing with 
epileptic drivers.  An epileptic who is aware of her condition and suf-
fers from a seizure while driving may be held liable for any resulting 
accidents.142  An epileptic, of course, is not responsible in the tradi-
137 See Rice & Harris, supra note 13, at 405 (“Alcohol has been found to be related 
to criminality and especially to violence in a number of . . . studies.” (citation omit-
ted)). 
138 See SPEAKING, supra note 52, at 8 (stating that substance abuse can both exacer-
bate the symptoms of, and reduce the effectiveness of treatment for, schizophrenia). 
139 See id. (“[S]moking has been found to interfere with the [patient’s] response to 
antipsychotic drugs.”). 
140 See Rice et al., supra note 51, at 177 (noting that “attendance at school or [a] 
job [has been] listed by clinicians as a recommended security precaution” for some 
forensic patients). 
141 I am assuming that the acquittee is insane at the time she recidivates.  Thus, 
she lacks the capacity for rationality at the time of the crime.  She, therefore, will not 
be responsible in the traditional sense for the commission of the crime. 
142 See, e.g., Holcomb v. Miller, 269 N.E.2d 885, 887-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (en 
banc) (holding that in order for an epileptic defendant’s seizure to “effectively excuse 
her failure to control the vehicle, [she] must . . . show[] by a preponderance of the 
evidence [that it] occurred without fair warning or under such circumstances as to pre-
clude her from taking reasonable precautions”); Martino v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 351 
So. 2d 204, 204-05 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (“Where it has been demonstrated that drivers 
have had prior blackout experience from epileptic convulsion . . . the courts have 
found negligence based on foreseeability.” (footnotes omitted)); People v. Decina, 152 
N.Y.S.2d 169, 171 (App. Div. 1956) (stating that awareness of a foreseeable condition 
that will “deprive [one] of effective control over the operation of [her] vehicle” is suf-
ficient for responsibility); Vinci v. Heimbach, Nos. 73440, 73464, 1998 WL 895381, at 
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1998) (“[C]ontinued driving, with knowledge of a diag-
nosed epileptic condition and prior seizures, would provide sufficient evidence of ig-
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tional sense; she is unconscious at the time of the seizure and thus is 
neither negligent nor reckless during the accident itself.  Both negli-
gence and recklessness presuppose voluntary action.  Nonetheless, the 
epileptic is deemed responsible for failing to do everything within her 
power before the accident to avoid a grave risk of which she was con-
sciously aware—the risk of having a seizure while driving.  “It suffices 
if [an epileptic] is aware of a condition which will deprive [her] of ef-
fective control over the operation of the vehicle and can foresee that 
such condition is likely to occur.”143
Similarly, the acquittee should be held responsible because of her 
conscious failure to avoid the serious risk of becoming insane again 
and recidivating.  Like the epileptic who is aware of her medical his-
tory, the insanity acquittee is deemed to be on notice of her potential 
mental instability, and she must take the appropriate steps to guard 
against it. 
C.  Exceptions to the Proposal 
Under my proposal, not all insanity acquittee recidivists will be 
considered criminally responsible.  To be deemed nonresponsible, 
and thus to be able to assert the insanity defense, an acquittee must 
have (1) rigorously abided by her prescribed treatment regimen yet 
decompensated, (2) lapsed from the treatment regimen through no 
fault of her own, or (3) committed a crime which truly was not fore-
seeable. 
Although it is true that medication noncompliance is the primary 
reason that mentally ill individuals relapse,144 a person’s mental condi-
tion may deteriorate for an array of inexplicable reasons.  Antipsy-
chotic medication is extremely effective in treating most psychotic 
disorders, but it is not foolproof.  Thus, an acquittee may suffer a re-
lapse even though she consistently takes her medication.145  If the ac-
quittee can successfully establish that she rigidly adhered to her 
course of treatment, yet still mentally deteriorated, she will be able to 
assert the affirmative defense of insanity. 
noring a foreseeable risk to recover on a claim of negligence if the condition is un-
treated or the driver ignores his physician’s warnings or advice.”). 
143 Decina, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 171. 
144 See Manahan, supra note 44, at 20 (asserting that medication compliance is es-
sential to prevent relapse). 
145 See SPEAKING, supra note 52, at 15-16 (stating that although relapses of mental 
illness are more likely to occur when “antipsychotic medications are discontinued or 
taken irregularly,” patients who continue their drug treatment may suffer relapses). 
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The second exception requires an insanity acquittee to demon-
strate that she is not responsible for her failure to follow her treat-
ment regimen.  Take, for example, the following scenario:  the acquit-
tee is involved in a severe car accident and is hospitalized.  The 
hospital doctors negligently fail to provide the acquittee with her an-
tipsychotic medication, despite her requests for it.  The acquittee 
quickly begins to decompensate and by the time she is released from 
the hospital she has lost all insight into her disorder and no longer be-
lieves that she needs medication to function properly.  Under such 
circumstances, the acquittee is truly not responsible for her noncom-
pliance, and she would be able to raise the insanity defense. 
Finally, if an insanity acquittee commits a crime that she could not 
have reasonably foreseen to be a consequence of decompensation, she 
cannot be deemed criminally responsible.  An acquittee recidivist, like 
an epileptic driver, should only be held responsible for the conse-
quences of actions she could have foreseen and taken steps to pre-
vent.  Thus, an insanity acquittee who knows that she is prone to com-
mit petty theft while insane should not be expected to foresee that she 
might commit murder while insane.  If an insanity acquittee commits 
such an unforeseeable act, then she may not be held responsible and 
should be able to rely on the insanity defense. 
D.  How to Implement the Proposal 
For my proposal to operate effectively in practice, several impor-
tant changes would have to be made to our current criminal justice 
and PIAC systems.  First, each acquittee released from PIAC would 
have to receive a detailed treatment regimen, outlining the specific 
medicines that she is to take and the psychiatrists and/or psycholo-
gists she is to meet with on a regular basis.146  The acquittee’s personal 
risk factors would also have to be determined and carefully explained 
to her so that she would be able to avoid them.147
Second, states would have to take a more active role in providing 
insanity acquittees with post-release mental health care services.  An 
acquittee can only adhere to her treatment regimen if a high-quality, 
accessible regimen is firmly in place.  The state, therefore, will have to 
146 Currently, only acquittees who are conditionally released receive such instruc-
tions upon release.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
147 See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text (pointing to alcohol, nicotine, 
and poor school or work attendance as risk factors). 
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ensure that it provides acquittees with the follow-up care they need in 
order to preserve their mental health.148
Finally, the provision of mental health care services in prison 
would have to be significantly enhanced.  Although a substantial 
number of prisoners are mentally ill,149 they often fail to receive the 
necessary psychological treatment in jail.  If my proposal were imple-
mented, an even larger number of those suffering from mental disor-
ders would be incarcerated.  Although imprisoning such offenders in-
capacitates them and attaches criminal responsibility to their actions, 
it fails to adequately treat their mental illnesses.  If the mental illness is 
not properly treated, the dangerousness and mental instability of the 
acquittee will most likely not be alleviated, and the recidivism problem 
may be exacerbated.  Thus, prisons will have to ensure that inmates 
are regularly receiving the appropriate antipsychotic medication.150
One potential criticism of my proposal is that prisons will become 
overburdened with psychotic inmates with whom they are not 
equipped to deal.  The most reasonable way to manage this problem is 
to treat an offender initially while she is in an acute psychotic state in 
the hospital.  It should not take long to stabilize her, particularly be-
cause an effective treatment regimen was previously developed for her 
during PIAC.  Once she has been stabilized, she can then be trans-
ferred to the prison, where she will continue to receive her regular 
course of antipsychotic medication. 
E.  Constitutionality of the Proposal 
Withholding the insanity defense from certain acquittee recidivists 
is constitutional because (1) the Supreme Court has never held that 
the insanity defense is constitutionally mandated,151 and (2) even if 
148 If the state allows an acquittee to fall through the cracks, despite the acquittee’s 
efforts to follow her regimen, the acquittee may qualify for an exception to the pro-
posal. 
149 See REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 844 (noting estimations that approximately 
fourteen percent of convicted felons are psychotic and thirty-five percent suffer from 
character disorders). 
150 If an inmate refuses to voluntarily take antipsychotic medication, the state may 
medicate her without her consent “if the inmate is dangerous to [herself] or others 
and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”  Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210, 227 (1990). 
151 Language of prior Supreme Court opinions “suggests rather convincingly that 
[the] Court would conclude that the due process [clause] of the fifth amendment does 
not require the states to provide a criminal defendant with an independent defense of 
insanity.”  State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 918 (Idaho 1990).  The Court has consistently 
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the insanity defense were constitutionally mandated, my proposal only 
restricts criminally responsible recidivists from employing it. 
Unlike the complete abolishment of the insanity defense and the 
GBMI verdict, my proposal recognizes that the insanity defense is a 
valid affirmative defense that first-time offenders are entitled to assert.  
The insanity defense properly recognizes that if an individual’s mental 
illness sufficiently deprives her of the capacity for rationality, then she 
is not criminally blameworthy for her resultant actions.  My proposal is 
consistent with the basic assumption that the nonresponsibly danger-
ous should not be subjected to criminal blame and punishment. 
Rather, my proposal recognizes that certain insanity acquittees 
(i.e., those adjudged sane upon their release from PIAC) must be 
compelled to take responsibility for their mental health in the interest 
of public safety.  Therefore, sane acquittees who willfully fail to abide 
by their treatment regimen are responsible; if their mental decompensa-
tion is a result of their deliberate acts or omissions, then criminal 
blame and punishment are in fact appropriate. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
It is often contended that “a vital function of the ‘forensic mental 
health system is the safe release, after confinement and inpatient 
treatment,’” of insanity acquittees.152  The current state of insanity ac-
quittee jurisprudence, however, requires the release of acquittees after 
they are either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous.153  
Thus, whether or not the acquittee may be safely reintegrated into so-
emphasized that states have broad discretion in defining the substantive elements of 
their crimes and affirmative defenses.  In Leland v. Oregon,  the Court declined to con-
stitutionally require a particular version of the insanity defense and upheld a statute 
that placed the burden of proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt on the defen-
dant.  343 U.S. 790, 798-90 (1952).  In Powell v. Texas, the Court again stressed that 
states enjoy great flexibility in developing substantive criminal law doctrines.  392 U.S. 
514, 535-36 (1968).  Justice Marshall further cautioned in Powell that “[n]othing could 
be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into defining some sort of insanity 
test in constitutional terms.”  Id. at 536.  Marshall’s sentiment was later echoed by Jus-
tice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in Ake v. Oklahoma:  “It is highly doubtful that 
due process requires a State to make available an insanity defense to a criminal defen-
dant . . . .”  470 U.S. 68, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
152 Harris, supra note 11, at 228 (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Mark R. Wiederanders 
et al., Forensic Conditional Release Programs and Outcomes in Three States, 20 INT’L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 249, 249 (1997)). 
153 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992), and Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983)). 
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ciety may not always be the determinative factor in a release deci-
sion.154
An insanity acquittee’s adherence to an appropriate regime of 
medication is vital in preventing recidivism.155  Therefore, in order to 
minimize post-release acquittee recidivism, medication compliance 
must be ensured.  The current methods adopted by states to deal with 
this dilemma are impractical, inequitable, or unconstitutional. 
My proposal is a more appropriate method of dealing with certain 
insanity acquittee recidivists than is rehospitalization.  First, there are 
distinct differences between incarcerating an offender and commit-
ting her to a state mental institution.156  In the case of imprisonment, 
the offender is deemed criminally responsible; in the case of hospi-
talization, she is not.157  To the extent that one believes criminal re-
sponsibility reflects society’s judgment of a person’s moral blamewor-
thiness and culpability, this distinction is important.  Under my 
proposal, the acquittee should be forced to take a certain degree of 
responsibility for her own mental health.  If she willfully fails to do so, 
she should not receive the benefit of the “not guilty” verdict. 
Additionally, permitting only the truly nonresponsible recidivists 
to employ the insanity defense may deter acquittees more effectively 
than the threat of rehospitalization and thereby reduce acquittee re-
cidivism.  If an acquittee is aware that failure to take her medication 
may result in imprisonment, she may be more inclined to abide by the 
prescribed treatment regimen.  Although the threat of rehospitaliza-
tion may also induce the acquittee to comply with her course of medi-
cation, the hospital is a more familiar environment for most acquittees 
and thus a less worrisome possibility.158
154 See, e.g., Foucha, 504 U.S. at 85-86 (holding that Louisiana had to release an ac-
quittee who was no longer mentally ill, but still dangerous). 
155 See supra note 44 (citing an argument on the importance of medication com-
pliance). 
156 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (outlining the distinction be-
tween incarceration and hospitalization). 
157 See Jones, 463 U.S. at 369 (“As [the acquittee] was not convicted, he may not be 
punished.”). 
158 It is important to reiterate that my proposal is based on the assumption that at 
the time of her release from PIAC, the acquittee is sane and thus capable of rational 
thought.  At that point in time, she is fully able to evaluate the advantages and disad-
vantages of continuing to take her medication. 
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Furthermore, because of the undefined nature and duration of 
PIAC,159 rehospitalization often results in the “revolving-door” pa-
tient.160  Once an acquittee regains her sanity or is no longer danger-
ous, the state must release her.161  If there is no method of ensuring 
that the acquittee continues to take her medication after release, she 
may quickly become insane again, recidivate, and be rehospitalized.  
The advent of antipsychotic medication accelerates the cycle because 
the sanity of acquittees can be quickly restored in the hospital, leading 
to shorter, but perhaps more frequent, hospital stays.162
If an acquittee is particularly dangerous while insane,163 this se-
quence of events is all the more troubling.  My proposal addresses this 
problem in two respects.  First, by threatening acquittees with punitive 
sanctions, the proposal will likely enhance medication compliance 
and thus reduce the likelihood that acquittees will recidivate.  Second, 
by incarcerating certain acquittee recidivists, it ensures that they are 
incapacitated for a fixed period of time, thereby minimizing the 
number of “revolving-door” acquittees. 
Ultimately, my proposal compels insanity acquittees to take re-
sponsibility for their own mental health.  I am by no means suggesting 
that the mentally ill are responsible for having a mental illness.  
Rather, I am asserting that when their mental illness causes them to 
be dangerous, the acquittees must bear some of the costs and take all 
conceivable precautions to prevent themselves from decompensating 
and placing society at risk again. 
 
159 See Jones, 463 U.S. at 370 (holding that the duration of PIAC depends on the 
concurrent presence of mental illness and dangerousness). 
160 See Wisor, supra note 45, at 159-60 (explaining that once a stabilized patient is 
released, she may stop taking her medications, requiring rehospitalization). 
161 See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86 (holding that a person who is no longer mentally ill 
must be released, even if she is still dangerous) . 
162 See Wisor, supra note 45, at 160 (“Past studies indicate that as many as forty per-
cent of patients released from state hospitals can be expected to need rehospitalization 
within six months.” (footnote omitted)). 
163 But note that some research indicates that “people with mental illness are no 
more dangerous as a class than the general population,” although “[m]ore recent re-
search is inconclusive on this point.”  REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 682-83. 
